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Carlos Medina and Hermes Martínez 
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Abstract 
We assess the role of inequality, poverty and drug prohibition, in explaining homicide rates 
(HR) in Colombia using panel data at the municipality level between 1990 and 1998. We use 
maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate several specifications of spatial models. When we 
pool the data we find a significant relation between the HR and poverty which is reinforced 
when the inequality variables are included in the regression. We use rates of arrest related to 
drugs as proxy for drug prohibition enforcement, and find no evidence of any net effect in this 
exercise. We proceed to estimate the model for every year since 1991 to 1998, and find mixed 
results along the analyzed period, with statistically significant positive coefficients for some 
years, evidencing a positive net effect for those years of drug prohibition on violence. This 
result calls for caution in the implementation of global policies meant to improve specific 
countries’ welfare, such as drug prohibition policies. On the other hand, our proxy for 
income inequality is not related to violence, while its relationship with poverty is weakly 
positive. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The study of the possible causes of the use of violence in contemporary societies, and the 
discovery and design of mechanisms to prevent it, has motivated a broad set of contributions 
to the literature from different academic fields. Among the most common insights used to 
approach the problem, have been those pointing to inequality of opportunities, and in 
particular, to income inequality, along with poverty, as the main causes of violence. In 
countries like Colombia and its Andean neighbors, however, in recent years people have also 
been worried about the implications of illicit drug consumption, production, and trafficking 
on patterns of violence. Globalization and recent terrorist events have contributed to 
deepening these concerns. 
 
Studying how inequality, poverty and drug prohibition are related is particularly appealing in 
the case of Colombia. Firstly, it is a country for which all three elements are present and 
potentially play a role in the determination of violence. Secondly, it is a country that has been 
subjected to strict international agreements leading to the prohibition and penalization of drug 
consumption, production, and trafficking. Even though such agreements are meant to prevent 
illegal drug use expansion throughout the globe, and to improve welfare in consumer and 
producer countries, such policies have raised serious concerns from several groups who 
wonder whether they are indeed having this effect. 
 
                                                 
1 Generous financial support from the Development Research Centre (DRC) of the Development Studies 
Institute (DESTIN) of London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and from the Program Jóvenes 
Investigadores of COLCIENCIAS, is gratefully acknowledged.  We thank participants of a seminar at DESTIN 
for their comments.  The usual disclaimers apply. 
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Usually the belief that illegal drug consumption leads to violent behavior is taken as a given. 
Under this perspective, prohibiting its use and production would appear to lead 
straightforwardly to the reduction of violence in consumer countries. This is half of the story 
though, since on the other hand, as long as there is demand for illicit drugs, and market 
arbitrage in some way, there will be supply. Of course, this activity under prohibition 
becomes a risky one, but then again, even though it is true that the riskier the activity the 
lower the consumption, it is also true that the lower the consumption, the higher the price 
those consumers remaining in the market are willing to pay, and thus, the greater the risks 
those producers remaining in the market are willing to face. 
 
The resulting high price that prevents the market from disappearing, does not fill  the pockets 
of the producers. An important share of it is spent ‘peacefully’ corrupting officials in charge 
of the prohibition campaign, while another is spent violently in the production and 
distribution process. Regretfully, since by definition this is an illegal activity, producers in 
this market have no legal mechanism to enforce disputes, and thus can only resort to violence 
when a dispute emerges. The bottom line is that prohibition induces violent behavior as well. 
 
It is of crucial importance to assess the net impact of these counteracting effects if we want to 
determine whether the prohibition policies are leading to the results they initially meant or 
not. In this paper we use a simple analytical framework to approach this question and 
determine whether inequality, poverty, and drug prohibition are positively related to violence 
or not in Colombia. 
 
We use panel data at the municipal level between 1990 and 1998 to estimate a simple model 
that relates these variables to the homicide rate, our measure of violence. We find no relation 
between our measure of inequality and violence, a weak relationship with poverty, and mixed 
results with drug prohibition, with statistically significant positive coefficients for some 
years, evidencing a positive net effect for those years of drug prohibition on violence.  
 
The article begins by presenting a brief review of previous related work and a description of 
the analytical framework, continues with the theoretical and empirical models, the data used, 
and finally, presents the results and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Previous Work 
 
There have been no previous studies attempting to assess the impact of drug prohib ition on 
violence in Colombia, though there have been several concerned with the role of inequality 
and poverty. Maybe the work that most closely compares to ours is that of Martínez. 2  Using 
a similar set of data, that article assessed the role of spatial dependence in the determination 
of violence in Colombia, once controlling for a similar set of covariates to ours. In particular, 
he used the homicide rate for 678 municipalities, for the years 1990-1998, as the dependent 
variable. His set of covariates included urban and rural inequality, the presence of armed 
groups, and the population’s poverty. The main focus of that work, though, was on the 
relationship of inequality and poverty with violence, and did not assess the potential role of 
drug prohibition in determining violence. The article found a significantly positive 
                                                 
2 Hermes Martínez, ‘Estudio Espacial de la Violencia en Colombia’, Masters Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 
2002. 
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relationship between poverty and violence, and no relationship between inequality and 
violence. 
 
Our work differs to that of Martínez by questioning the role of drug prohibition in violence.  
Just like Martínez, we get the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with the pooled data 
of the period 1991-1998.  In addition, we get MLE, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates 
and Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates for each of the years, getting results both with and 
without specific distributional assumptions about the error term. 
  
Other works that were developed with similar motivations to that by Martínez are those of 
Sánchez and Núñez, and Sarmiento and Becerra.3 These authors performed basically the 
same analysis as Martínez, but omitted the role of spatial dependence in the determination of 
violence.  To the extent that the results obtained by Martínez reject the standard specification 
that omits the role of spatial dependence, these results lead to biased estimates. In some of the 
previous work the magnitude of this bias was small, while in others not only the magnitude, 
but also the sign, led to different conclusions. 
 
Sarmiento and Becerra have also tried to explain the relationship between poverty and 
equity. 4 The purpose of their paper was to explain the homicide rate using a quantitative 
approximation. A multivariate regression model was used to explain the variations in the 
homicide rate over 867 municipalities. The model followed the basic hypothesis of the paper, 
which is that violence is a problem of a structural character. Thus the dependent variable was 
the homicide rate and the explicative variables were wealth, inequality, human capital, 
municipality’s size, financial support from the government, citizen participation and the 
presence of illegal military groups, guerrillas and paramilitaries. 
 
Their main result was that the probability that violence would be reproduced tended to be 
greater in places in which economic accumulation was highly probable. They conclude that 
this might be the reason why the wealthier departments were the most violent. On the other 
hand, in their results inequality is positively associated with violence, meaning that the most 
violent municipalities are likely to present more inequalities. Finally, education and citizen 
participation presented a negative association with violence. 
 
In a similar study, Sarmiento and Becerra confirm the positive association between violence 
and inequality. 5 They find that inequality, measured using the GINI coefficient, has been the 
main cause of the increase in violence in the decade of the nineties. 
 
Sánchez and Núñez have tried to find the variables that determine violence in Colombia and separate 
out their contribution in the national homicide rate and in the differences of homicide rates among 
violent and non-violent municipalities.6 For that purpose, longitudinal data were compiled for the 
seven principal cities of the country, and for those municipalities for which there was information 
                                                 
3 Fabio Sánchez & Jairo Núñez, Determinantes del Crimen Violento en un País Altamente Violento: El Caso 
Colombiano, Documento CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, 2001; Alfredo Sarmiento & María Becerra,  
Análisis de las Relaciones entre Violencia y Equidad, Archivos de Macroeconomía. Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, 1998; Alfredo Sarmiento & María Becerra, ‘Violencia y Equidad’, in Alvaro Camacho Guisado & 
Francisco Leal (eds), Armar la Paz es Desarmar la Guerra , Centro de Estudios de Realidad Colombiana 
(CEREC), Misión Social del Departamento Nacional de Planeación y Presidencia de la República, 2000, 
pp.227-262. 
4 Sarmiento & Becerra (1998). 
5 Sarmiento & Becerra (2000). 
6 Sánchez & Núñez (2001). 
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concerning socioeconomic factors, armed actors and judicial performance. Specifically, estimations of 
the drug trafficking per capita income, presence of armed actors, and distribution indicators of urban 
and rural property were realized for each municipality. 
 
The purpose of that study was to contrast the hypothesis of inequality as the main cause of violence in 
the country. They got OLS estimates for a data panel of the mentioned municipalities for the years 
1990-1998. They found that Colombian violence follows special characteristics originated in the 
existence of armed groups, illegal activities, judicial inefficiency and diverse interactions among these 
variables.  According to their results, poverty, inequality and exclusion, do not produce a specific type 
of violence for Colombia. 
 
Finally, among the studies on the relationship between violence and inequality and poverty 
can be included the work of Rubio.7 This work stresses the fact that Colombia has one of the 
highest homicide rates in the world, of a comparable level to those countries in which a civil 
war has been declared. In addition, he organized the homicide rate geographically, including 
all the cities and small towns of the country, and found that the presence of violence is greater 
in rural areas than in urban ones. The article shows that Medellín, Colombia’s most violent 
city, ranked ninth in the country’s general list. 
 
He suggests that the causes of violence are not poverty or inequality, but that individual 
decisions  provide the reason why groups with greater access to education and employment 
produce most of the violence. Usually violence takes place in the most developed regions in 
the country, where guerrilla, paramilitaries and drug trafficking can be found. 
 
Also, Rubio states that the functioning of judicial institutions in Colombia generates 
incentives for criminal activity, and the increase in those activities affects the efficiency of 
the judicial institutions. Therefore, this could be understood as a vicious cycle between 
institutional efficiency and criminal activity.   
 
One of the working papers most related to this study is that of Miron. 8 It is motivated by the question 
of the effects on violence of the prohibition of drugs and alcohol.  One point of view states that 
prohibition decreases violence because the consumption of these substances induces aggressive 
behaviour and releases inhibitions. An alternative view is that prohibition potentially increases 
violence, since black markets are created and participants in those markets use violence to resolve 
commercial disputes. 
 
Miron’s paper uses longitudinal data to study the relationship between prohibition and violence using 
the historical behavior of the homicide rate in the United States. The document concludes that 
enforcement of drug and alcohol prohibition is associated with increases in homicide rate. In addition, 
this positive correlation reflects the causality of prohibition enforcement on homicide. The conclusion 
of the study robustly included other potential determinants of the homicide rate, like age composition, 
incarceration rate, economic conditions, gun availability and the death penalty. Thus, he concludes 
that drug and alcohol prohibition were associated with the rise of the homicide rate in the United 
States for over 100 years. 
 
This paper complements the previous work done on Colombia by asking a similar question to that 
asked by Miron about the American economy, not previously addressed in the Colombian case: does 
drug prohibition increase violence? To answer this question, we use a different empirical approach 
than that used by Miron, since longitudinal data of the key variables needed to produce a robust 
                                                 
7 Mauricio Rubio, Crimen e Impunidad, precisiones sobre la Violencia, TM Editores y CEDE, 1999. 
8 Jeffrey A. Miron, ‘Violence and US Prohibitions of Drugs and Alcohol’, NBER Working Paper No. 6950, 
February 1999. 
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answer to this question is only available for a very short period of time. In particular, we use spatial 
information at the municipality level, like the other studies mentioned, and use a similar rationale to 
that adopted by Miron to answer our question. 
 
 
3. Analytical Framework: Relationship between drug prohibition and violence 
 
While arguing that inequality and poverty are related to violence might not seem to be a 
strange idea, a similar relationship between drug prohibition and violence seems less familiar 
and calls for a framework for analysis. 
 
In this section we will provide a brief outline of the concepts used to relate prohibition to 
violence, and then proceed to identify their relationship. Our approach is the same as that 
used by Miron, which introduces the demand for violence as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution. 9 
 
Is it commonly observed that disputes arise from everyday market activities. Once these 
disputes emerge, agents can either attempt to resolve them by legal or illegal means. Clearly, 
disputes within legal activities are better suited to be resolved by legal means than disputes 
within illegal or prohibited activities. This framework provides us with a clear mechanism 
through which prohibition causes violence: economic agents involved in disputes over their 
market activities are more likely to employ violence to resolve them when such activities are 
prohibited. 
 
Even if we accept such a claim, in our case it would not, by itself, be very useful to identify 
any causal relationship between drug prohibition and violence. Firstly, our available 
longitudinal data covers a short period of time that begins in 1978, through which prohibition 
laws showed little variation. The production and trafficking of drugs like cocaine was 
prohibited throughout the period, and changes in legislation associated to their prohibition 
was related to whether drug traffickers should be extradited and the like, rather than to any 
change in the legality of such activities. Secondly, these laws did not vary at the national 
level, that is to say, they remained the same across municipalities, our unit of observation. 
 
Our claim becomes useful when we realize that even though the laws have not varied through 
time nor across municipalities, their enforcement has. While enforcement of an illegal market 
activity is not a necessary condition for the activity to be considered as prohibited, lack of 
enforcement leaves prohibition as a mere label associated to the illegal activity, which in 
several ways weakens the relationship between prohibition and violence. In other words, we 
can modify our claim by saying that prohibition of market activities causes more violence, 
the more enforced the prohibition of these activities is. 
 
Our claim does not mean that enforcement produces a net increase in violence, since there 
might be mechanisms through which prohibition lowers violence as well. The net outcome 
would depend on the relative importance of the relevant counteracting forces. To this extent, 
it is useful to enumerate some of the possible channels through which more enforcement can 
increase violence. 
 
One clear illustration of how increases in enforcement in Colombia produce an increase in 
violence is provided by the law for the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers. Early in the 
                                                 
9 Miron (1999). 
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nineties, the presentation and approval of such a law in the congress led drug cartels to 
promote a war against it, which led to the murder of a candidate for the presidency and a 
Minister of Justice among others.  
 
As mentioned above, though, this type of enforcement occurred at the national level and 
through rather rare interventions, and does not provide us with a neat mechanism for 
identifying the relationship of interest. Thus, we should focus on the channels that work even 
while maintaining constant legislation. 
 
First consider what happens when enforcement is low, for example in municipalities with 
very low enforcement of the prohibition of production or trafficking of cocaine. In these 
municipalities, individuals would be more likely to get involved in the illegal activity than in 
other municipalities with higher levels of enforcement, since lack of enforcement lowers the 
risk premium workers in the illegal sector pay when involved in it. In addition, if disputes 
emerge related to land possession or the like, the use made of the land under dispute would 
not become an issue important enough to prevent the parties from resorting to legal means to 
resolve the dispute. Thus, we would expect lower demand for violence as a means for solving 
conflict. On the other hand, consider what happens when enforcement is high. In this case, 
supply is restricted, and thus those who manage to produce and traffic (consume) the illegal 
good and get involved in the illegal activity, are the ones that receive (are willing to pay) the 
highest price for it, and then are more willing to resort to violence when undertaking the 
illegal activity. 
 
A different channel through which increases in enforcement can increase violence emerges 
when these increases in enforcement disrupt the equilibrium previously obtained in the black 
market. This happened to some extent in Colombia when the government first fought against 
the Medellín Drug Cartel and captured Pablo Escobar, and only then went after the leaders of 
the Cali Drug Cartel. Such timing chosen by the government, led to a new accommodation in 
the share of the Colombian cocaine market that these participants had, and generated some 
disputes between them during the period the government intervention was implemented. 
While this constitutes another interesting example of this mechanism, it does not provide 
important insights into the situation at the level of the Colombian municipalities either. 
 
Another example of this type of situation, more suited for our purposes and data, is the 
disruption by the military forces of the equilibrium between illicit groups at the municipal 
level. During the 1990s, guerrilla and paramilitary groups gained a presence in particular 
regions of the country, which led Colombians to perceive the country as being split between 
military-, guerrilla-, and paramilitary-dominated regions. The action of the military forces 
weakened the equilibrium between the paramilitary and guerrilla forces, leading them to get 
involved in several territorial disputes.  This was the case in regions like the Urabá 
Antioqueño, the South of the state of Bolivar, and the Magdalena Medio, to mention just 
three examples. Thus, increases in enforcement in these municipalities, clearly led to 
increases in violence.  
 
In this example we are implicitly assuming that the actions of the guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups are highly determined by their involvement in drug production and trafficking. 
Although the caveat is valid, we consider that it does not invalidate most of our intuition 
relating to the causality between enforcement and violence. There are at least two reasons 
why this is to a large extent the case. Firstly, as reported and quantified by Matthiesen and 
Echeverry et al., it has been widely recognized that most of the economic resources of these 
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groups come from these activities.10 Secondly, the link between enforcement and violence 
was also demonstrated when the American government approved the use of the Plan 
Colombia resources  (which in principle were meant to be used exclusively in the war against 
drugs) to fight guerrilla and paramilitary groups, due to the recognition by the American 
government of the important role played by these groups in drug production and trafficking. 
 
Another common mechanism through which increases in enforcement lead to increases in 
violence is the use of retaliation on the part of the participants in illegal activities. Military 
victories by the Colombian armed forces have been commonly followed by retaliation on the 
part of guerrilla groups that take the form of attacks on small towns, the murder of their 
police, and currently, even the use of murder threats against the mayors of the municipalities 
and their officials, which have been followed in some cases by action. 
 
Finally, important increases in drug enforcement, in particular under very tight budget 
conditions,  which has been the case in Colombia, has led to the displacement of resources 
from general crime deterrence towards drug prohibition. This fact becomes even more acute 
in the Colombian case, since the country has been simultaneously involved in an internal 
conflict against organized groups, which has also taken resources away from general crime 
deterrence. 
 
 
4. Theoretical and Empirical Models 
 
We use Miron’s approach to explain violence as a function of enforcement.11 The model 
assumes that the production of goods requires conflict resolution, which in turn implies the 
demand of two inputs, lawsuits (L) and homicides (H). Given enforcement, individuals chose 
the number of lawsuits and homicides to minimize costs for any given level of output. 
Constant returns to scale are assumed, which implies input demand functions of the form 
 
and 
 
 
where wl and wh are the prices of lawsuits and homicides, e is the level of enforcement, and Q 
is the output. It is assumed that the price of lawsuits, wl, is increasing in e, thus wl’(e)>0. The 
equilibrium price of the good becomes 
 
 
Finally, a demand curve is assumed of the form 
 
 
Equations (2), (3) y (4) allow us to find the following function that relates the homicide rate 
to the level of enforcement 
 
Based on which we specify our empirical model as 
                                                 
10 T. Matthiesen, "Human Rights" Guerilla Movements and the Illegal Drug Industry in Colombia 1980-1996, 
mimeo, Fedesarrollo-New School University, 1997; Juan Carlos Echeverry, G. Piraquive, N. Salazar, Ma. 
Victoria Angulo, Gustavo Hernández, Cielo Ma.Numpaque, I.  Fainboim & Carlos J Rodríguez, ‘El Balance del 
Sector Público y la Sostenibilidad Fiscal en Colombia’, Archivos de Macroeconomía, Document 15, 1999. 
11 Miron (1999). 
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where hit is the homicide rate, xit is a vector of covariates that might affect the homicide rate, 
among which we include proxies for inequality of income distribution and poverty, and uit is 
the error term. 
 
Equations (5) and (6) are reduced form equations of the homicide rate on the enforcement 
level and other variables, and to that extent, the parameter b  indicates net effects of 
enforcement on the homicide rate. The mechanism by which enforcement induces violence in 
this model is through the increase in the price of lawsuits, which in turn leads to input 
substitution from lawsuits to violence in the model. While a statistically significant positive 
sign of the b  parameter would indicate that a net increase of enforcement increases violence, 
it does not imply that there does not exist any other mechanism through which enforcement 
reduces violence as well. 
 
Estimation of equation (6) will lead to an unbiased estimate of the parameter b  if the level of 
enforcement, eit, is exogenous, if uit does not contain important information that might affect 
the homicide rate, and finally, given the spatial character of our data, if there is no type of 
spatial dependence. 
 
The possible endogeneity of enforcement comes from the fact that one would expect more 
enforcement to be assigned to municipalities under higher levels of conflict, meaning that 
violence and enforcement mutually determine each other. 
 
We use the rate of captures of individuals involved in prohibited drug related activities as the 
measure of enforcement. While at first sight this variable might seem highly endogenous, 
there are reasons to believe that there is no endogeneity, or at least, that it is very limited. The 
main reason comes from the fact that while drug related activities take place on a daily basis, 
a large share of the decisions concerning the monitoring and prosecution of drug related 
activities are taken only after months or years of observing the illegal behavior. In order to 
deter these activities, the government establishes standard procedures of monitoring illegal 
activities in strategic places suited for them to take place, and only revises its monitoring 
strategy after enough information has been collected. Thus we can expect enforcement 
decisions to be made based on historical rather than contemporaneous information on drug 
related activities. 
 
The problem of omitted variables is one that will very likely affect to some extent our results, 
nonetheless, as we will see in the results, the estimated b  parameter seems to be robust to the 
inclusion of variables and to the instrumentation of enforcement. 
 
Finally, the issue of spatial dependence is tested, and three different specifications are 
considered in order to account for this problem. These specifications can be illustrated using 
the following model 
Where W is a spatial matrix with zeros in the diagonal that determines the form of the spatial 
dependence among the municipalities.12 
                                                 
12 For additional details on spatial models see Luc Anselin, Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models, Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988; and Harry H. Kelejian & Ingmar R.Prucha, ‘A Generalized Spatial Two 
( )6
itititit uexh ++= ba
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5. Data 
 
Table 1 (see Appendix) presents descriptive statistics of the variables used for the years 1990 
to 1998. The variable used to measure the level of violence of the municipality is the 
homicide rate, which measures the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. We also 
include two proxies for income inequality, the variables GiniUAA and GiniRAA, which are 
the Gini coefficients of distribution of the value of real state property in the urban and rural 
areas of the municipality respectively. Though we perceive these variables as poor predictors 
of income inequality in the municipality, we include them in order to compare our results to 
those obtained in previous work. In addition, we include the Index of Unsatisfied Needs 
(NBI), defined as the share of poor population in the municipality, as a measure of poverty. 
Other control variables include the number of attacks per capita by the first and second 
largest guerrilla groups in Colombia, the  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación nacional (ELN). Finally, we include the presence of 
military police (PM) in the municipality and the real amount of social expenditure per capita. 
Again, our measure of enforcement in each municipality is given by the rate of captures in 
the state where it is located. 
 
 
6. Results 
 
This section presents the results obtained in the estimation of equation (6) and it is divided 
into two parts. The first part presents aggregate results for the nineties obtained by pooling 
the data for the 1991-1998 period, while the second part presents year specific results. 
 
6.1 Aggregate Results for the Nineties 
Table 2 (see Appendix) presents the MLE of model (7) with l=0.13 We begin noting that our 
proxies for income inequality in the municipality, i.e. GiniUAA and GiniRAA, show no 
relationship to the homicide rate. This result is likely to be due to the definition of the proxies 
themselves. Since for the cases when some people own more than one property we are unable 
to identify which properties belong to them, the indicators are just a measure of the inequality 
in the distribution of the value of the properties in the municipality. The relationship follows 
then from the lack of explanatory power to explain the homicide rate of variations in the 
inequality of the way land was split into properties across municipalities. 
 
As found by Martínez, municipality poverty rates, as measured by the share of the population 
with at least one unsatisfied basic need, have a positive effect on the homicide rate, 
increasing it at a decreasing rate.14 However, lack of significance of the coefficient of the 
linear term sheds doubts on the actual effect of poverty on violence. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Stage Least Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autorregressive Model with Autorregressive 
Disturbances’, Journal of Real State Finance and Economics, 1997. 
13 Models with both r¹0 and/or l¹0 were estimated and the autoregressive model (r¹0 and l=0) was chosen 
among them. MLE of the autoregressive model are obtained with a two-stage procedure in which all coefficients 
but r are estimated in the first step, and then r is estimated through a concentrated likelihood (for details see: 
James P. LeSage, ‘Toolbox’ Spatial Econometrics Applications Manual, http://www.spatial-econometrics.com, 
Department of Economics, University of Toledo, 2001.). Tests of spatial dependence are not presented since 
these tests have proven to reject the standard model which does not incorporates the spatial component by 
Martínez (2002), who uses a similar specification. 
14 Martínez (2002). 
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Next, we find that the estimate of b , the coefficient of the level of enforcement, has a positive 
but not statistically significant relationship with violence once we control for a set of 
covariates. The estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of the lagged homicide rate, FARC and 
ELN variables, but remains invariant to the inclusion of our inequality measures or the 
military police variables. 
 
The number of attacks performed by FARC and ELN guerrilla groups are, as expected, 
positive and statistically significantly related to the homicide rate. The presence of military 
police in the municipality does not present any relationship to the homicide rate. This result 
might be due to an endogeneity problem with this variable, which we address below. 
 
Finally, the spatial autoregressive term is strongly positively related to the homicide rate, 
evidencing the existence of important spillover effects in the transmission of violence across 
municipalities in Colombia. 
 
6.2 Specific Results by Year 
In this section we present the results obtained from estimating the model (7) year by year. We 
present ML estimates, along with yearly instrumental variable estimates. 
 
First, let us analyze the MLE of model (7) for each year, which are presented in Table 3 (see 
Appendix). The first thing to highlight is that most of the estimated coefficients present 
significant variation with time, which suggests that the equality of coefficients for all years, 
implicit in the pooled data estimation, might be too restrictive. The intuition obtained in the 
pooled estimation follows in this case for several of the variables included in the estimation, 
as it is the case for the autoregressive term, the inequality, the FARC and the lagged homicide 
rate. While the NBI2 was significantly negatively related to the homicide rate in the pooled 
data estimation, it is not so for any one year. However, its magnitude does not vary much 
with time, which suggests that the result obtained by pooling the data might actually be 
informative, allowing the larger sample to produce significant estimates. ELN is only 
significantly positively related to the homicide rate for a single year, and captures for no year. 
 
Now let us study the OLS estimates of model (6), which ignore spatial dependence. Table 4 
(see Appendix) presents these results along with several tests of spatial dependence. The tests 
provide a strong indication of misspecification of the model due to its omission of the 
different forms of spatial dependence, which precludes this specification from providing 
consistent parameter estimates. While the table has some interesting and contrasting results 
with respect to those obtained for the pooled data, we will only discuss the consistent results 
to be obtained from specification (7). 
 
Table 5 (see Appendix) presents OLS estimates of the autoregressive spatial model. Since the 
term WY is clearly endogenous, the r coefficient estimated in the table is not consistent. Still, 
the estimates are similar to those found once WY is instrumented, as is shown in Table 6 (see 
Appendix). In that table, we follow the recommendations made by Anselin, and Kelejian and 
Prucha, and use X and WX as instruments for WY.15 Again, the estimates are similar in both 
tables, and its significance changes only in 1993, when once instrumented, the coefficient of 
the autoregressive term becomes insignificant. In this case, as opposed to the MLE, the 
                                                 
15 Anselin (1988) and Kelejian & Prucha (1997). 
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estimated r coefficient is allowed to be larger than one, as turns out to be the case in the OLS 
estimate for 1994, and the IV estimates for 1994 and 1996. 
 
The results show that none of the estimated coefficients of the variables related to inequality 
or poverty is significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficient of NBI2 is very 
similar for all the years to the one obtained with the corresponding specification in the MLE 
with the pooled data. This suggests that in this case, restricting the coefficients through time 
is a reasonable assumption to allow us to identify the actual relationship between poverty and 
violence, as obtained in the pooled MLE. That is, according to the results, it is reasonable to 
accept the negative relationship between NBI2 and violence obtained in the pooled MLE. 
 
On the other hand, the results show that the  net effect of prohibition, as measured by the b  
coefficient in equation (7) (the coefficient of captures in the table), is not as stable as is 
assumed in the pooled data estimation. That is, the results by year suggest that the null of 
constant b  during the 90s is likely to be rejected. In fact, both significantly negative (in 1991, 
1992, 1995 and 1997) and positive (in 1993 and 1994) coefficients are found in the analyzed 
period. 
 
We now proceed to assess the robustness of the results on inclusion of two variables, military 
police (PM) and real per capita social public expenditure (GSocRP). The OLS and IV results 
are presented in Tables 8 and 9 respectively (see Appendix). Most results follow through. The 
estimated coefficient of captures is now only significant in three years, 1994 (positive), and 
1995 and 1997 (negative) 
 
6.3 Endogeneity of Captures and Military Police 
As previously discussed, there are reasons to believe that the estimates of the coefficients of 
the captures and PM might be biased due to the endogeneity of these variables. In this section 
we present IV estimates obtained by treating these variables as endogenous. The results are 
presented in Table 10 (see Appendix). Only the coefficient of the PM variable changes 
slightly for 1997, becoming significantly positive, while the coefficients of this variable and 
of captures, remain similar to those obtained by IV assuming these variables as exogenous. 
Thus, the results suggest that the endogeneity of captures does not seem to be driving the 
results obtained. Additional results (not presented here), including in the set of instruments 
covering the lags of PM and captures, lead to similar conclusions. 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
Although we find that the relationship between drug prohibition and violence has not been 
monotonous during the 1990s, it has been positive in some years, evidencing the existence of 
a positive net effect of drug prohibition on violence. This result calls for caution when 
implementing global policies oriented toward improving specific countries’ welfare, such as 
drug prohibition policies. 
 
We find a significant relationship between second quadratic term of poverty and violence for 
the pooled data. This relationship is reinforced when the inequality variables are included in 
the regression. On the other hand, poverty is only weakly positively related to violence when 
using data for each year. Finally, our proxy for income inequality is not related to violence. 
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Thus, even though reducing poverty and trying to guarantee equal conditions to the 
population are always reasonable objectives to promote, we find no clear evidence that by 
these means any significant reduction of violence in Colombia will be obtained.   
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables. 1990-1998 
 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Homicide  52.076 59.277 60.435 59.548 54.120 45.566 47.528 50.714 48.319 
  61.484 66.729 64.809 72.755 61.304 50.658 49.776 60.926 64.753 
GiniUAA 0.3279 0.3589 0.3656 0.3722 0.386 0.3823 0.3785 0.3772 0.3787 
  0.1208 0.1299 0.113 0.116 0.115 0.1029 0.103 0.1015 0.0991 
GiniRAA 0.5143 0.5202 0.5298 0.5394 0.5449 0.5419 0.5389 0.5364 0.5348 
  0.1431 0.1413 0.136 0.1397 0.1392 0.1334 0.1348 0.1347 0.135 
NBI 54.884 53.397 51.981 50.631 49.344 48.116 46.946 45.829 44.764 
  16.747 16.901 17.116 17.381 17.685 18.021 18.384 18.770 19.177 
NBI2 3292.27 3136.48 2994.50 2865.10 2747.07 2639.47 2541.37 2452.12 2371.02 
  1905.60 1897.36 1898.39 1907.53 1924.35 1949.06 1982.29 2025.40 2080.07 
FARC 0.22 0.4504 0.2575 0.2127 0.2403 0.4126 0.4975 0.6029 0.454 
  1.0205 1.4747 0.7605 1.1547 0.9387 1.6995 1.3932 2.1362 1.6203 
ELN 0.191 0.151 0.1413 0.1152 0.1106 0.1579 0.2181 0.2117 0.1391 
  0.7663 0.6625 0.6158 0.6148 0.5248 0.6703 0.9001 0.7868 0.6842 
PM 17.173 17.526 17.816 17.157 18.284 16.413 16.243 16.038 16.376 
  6.2668 6.4476 4.9481 5.7094 5.4597 4.5581 4.7478 5.3851 5.6606 
GSocRP 27.675 27.270 27.981 44.759 45.681 40.344 57.987 57.003 36.682 
  28.475 23.218 20.053 40.498 41.140 68.806 84.430 72.682 38.285 
Captures 2176.46 4091.01 4347.85 4031.37 3506.44 6945.02 4371.81 4684.65 3513.32 
  2532.58 5388.34 5182.24 5424.19 4590.08 10858.52 5068.97 6164.37 4570.62 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
Definition of 
variables:         
Homicide: Homicide rate of the municipality. Number of homicides per 100.000 inhabitants. 
GiniUAA: Gini coefficient of distribution of the value of real state property in the urban area of the 
municipality. 
GiniRAA: Gini coefficient of distribution of the value of real state property in the rural area of the 
municipality. 
NBI: Percentage of population living in poverty in the municipality 
FARC: Number of attacks per capita of the largest guerrilla group in Colombia: Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia . 
ELN: Number of attacks per capita of the second largest guerrilla group in Colombia: Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional. 
PM: Military Police. 
GSocRP: Real per capita social expenditure. in pesos de 1998. 
Captures: Number of captures per million inhabitants related to drug production or trafficking in the 
municipality. 
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Table 2. MLE of the Spatial Autorregressive Model. Pooled Data. 1991-199816 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) 
Constant 9.5135 2.6802 0.1353 -2.1288 -2.2440 2.3820 -2.2039 -2.2503 1.7674 3.4677 0.1095 -2.1668 -2.2561 1.8279 
  1.32 0.37 0.03 -0.40 -0.41 0.33 -0.42 -0.41 0.44 0.48 0.02 -0.41 -0.41 0.45 
GiniRAA 0.7715 -0.6080 -0.6660 2.0849 2.0884 -0.8109 2.0316 2.0342   -0.9941 -0.7053 2.0218 2.0203   
  0.11 -0.09 -0.13 0.40 0.40 -0.11 0.39 0.39   -0.14 -0.13 0.39 0.39   
GiniUAA 13.9256 7.5448 1.5588 4.2827 4.3366 7.2110 4.1926 4.2174   8.2762 1.4977 4.2311 4.2603   
  2.42 1.31 0.37 1.02 1.02 1.25 0.99 0.99   1.43 0.35 1.00 1.00   
NBI 0.7318 0.9557 0.2677 0.2328 0.2315 0.9696 0.2367 0.2361 0.2026 0.9348 0.2705 0.2350 0.2341 0.2001 
  3.56 4.62 1.76 1.55 1.53 4.68 1.57 1.56 1.37 4.51 1.77 1.56 1.55 1.35 
NBI2 -0.0092 -0.0107 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0108 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0106 -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0026 
  -4.88 -5.65 -2.18 -2.14 -2.11 -5.69 -2.16 -2.14 -1.96 -5.57 -2.19 -2.15 -2.13 -1.94 
Captures    2.9582 0.1171 0.2376 0.2368 2.4598 0.1011 0.1019 0.1161           
    9.50 0.50 1.02 0.99 4.96 0.28 0.28 0.32           
Captures -1           0.6687 0.1847 0.1839 0.2103 2.6414 0.1512 0.2640 0.2603 0.3022 
            1.31 0.49 0.49 0.56 8.17 0.63 1.11 1.06 1.24 
Homicide -1     0.6789 0.6673 0.6675   0.6674 0.6675 0.6678   0.6791 0.6676 0.6675 0.6682 
      68.43  67.19 65.98   66.07  65.98 66.04   67.96 67.46 67.28 66.25  
FARC       4.8257 4.8241   4.8282 4.8277 4.8118     4.8269 4.8247 4.8101 
        12.63 12.56   12.63  12.57 12.54     12.63 12.57 12.54  
ELN       2.0729 2.0699   2.0759 2.0748 2.0336     2.0683 2.0651 2.0240 
        2.56 2.55   2.56 2.55 2.51     2.55 2.54 2.50 
Military Police         0.0100     0.0045 -0.0116       0.0055 -0.0097 
          0.09     0.04 -0.11       0.05 -0.09 
W*Homicide 0.4794 0.4491 0.2094 0.1983 0.1971 0.4469 0.1974 0.1967 0.1970 0.4574 0.2081 0.1980 0.1982 0.1972 
  28.07 27.23 15.57  13.38 11.50 24.85 11.56  11.47 11.49 25.77  13.97 13.41 13.37 11.57  
N 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 5.424 
log-likelihood -48.386 -48.340 -46.623 -46.538 -46.538 -46.623 -46.538 -46.538 -46.539 -48.352 -46.623 -46.538 -46.538 -46.539 
R2 0.1850 0.1936 0.5584 0.5716 0.5715 0.5584 0.5716 0.5716 0.5715 0.1915 0.5583 0.5716 0.5716 0.5715 
             
                                                
16 See definitions of variables in table 1 
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Table 3. Yearly MLE of the Spatial Autorregressive Model. 1991-199817 
 
Variable  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Constant 11.4950 -1.6750 24.1375 15.3989 5.2053 -10.5189 -11.9378 4.3522 
  0.5870 -0.0906 1.3262 0.9919 0.4029 -0.8223 -0.8035 0.2907 
W*Homicide  0.0515 0.2785 0.1580 0.3049 0.1824 0.2233 0.0942 0.0646 
  0.4801 7.1030 4.1682 7.5421 3.6765 4.5223 1.2702 1.3592 
GiniRAA 5.1102 -1.7761 8.7745 5.6102 -5.2251 12.9309 -5.6805 0.9433 
  0.4106 -0.1251 0.6107 0.4285 -0.4301 0.9966 -0.3459 0.0517 
GiniUAA -9.2896 4.6271 -4.1262 13.4139 1.8880 1.0946 4.9053 4.5271 
  -0.7772 0.3876 -0.3437 1.2245 0.1962 0.1074 0.3749 0.3311 
NBI 0.0111 0.0831 0.3506 -0.1158 0.1242 0.3474 0.0259 0.1688 
  0.0198 0.1573 0.6802 -0.2618 0.3620 1.0391 0.0681 0.4544 
NBI2 -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0058 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0032 
  -0.4047 -0.3288 -1.2308 -0.1229 -0.4874 -0.7570 -0.2733 -0.9309 
FARC 2.9919 3.2400 22.7964 -1.5320 3.4086 3.1605 2.2680 7.3970 
  2.6139 1.5591 16.6101 -0.9567 4.7947 3.2652 2.9656 6.4872 
ELN -1.4322 2.6867 1.5777 3.2781 -0.7173 6.3549 1.0314 3.1023 
  -0.5720 1.0667 0.6090 1.1936 -0.3958 4.2382 0.4846 1.1886 
Captures -0.4890 0.4620 0.3995 0.4656 -0.9163 0.9288 1.0970 0.3959 
  -0.3770 0.7282 0.8873 0.9411 -1.3283 1.2883 1.0721 0.4642 
Homicide-1 0.8104 0.6500 0.7870 0.5649 0.6019 0.5974 0.7953 0.6654 
  21.7945 25.3700 28.5029 24.9506 25.7975 20.3443 20.8470 21.2840 
Military Police 0.6215 0.1880 -1.7242 -0.7896 -0.0476 -0.0093 1.0590 -0.0024 
  2.0972 0.5405 -5.6039 -2.8189 -0.1734 -0.0305 3.1465 -0.0069 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
log-likelihood -5101.3 -5096.7 -5114.9 -5053.2 -4925.4 -4979.9 -5128.2 -5189.7 
R2 0.6379 0.6265 0.6843 0.6339 0.6281 0.5490 0.5304 0.5012 
     
 
                                                 
17 t-statistics in italics. See definitions of variables in table 1. 
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Table 4. OLS Estimates and Test for Spatial Dependence. 1991-1998.18 
 
Variable  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Constant 15.6590 11.1701 7.4806 1.9412 19.6983 -10.666 -13.662 -3.0013 
  0.99 0.62 0.36 0.13 1.61 -0.94 -1.11 -0.19 
GiniUAA 4.1289 -1.8276 4.8402 4.0592 -3.9317 11.1824 -1.1348 1.9831 
  0.41 -0.13 0.32 0.35 -0.40 0.99 -0.07 0.12 
GiniRAA -10.502 5.2795 -6.4691 14.3810 4.5421 5.0416 13.3204 -1.5749 
  -1.02 0.45 -0.51 1.28 0.45 0.53 1.00 -0.12 
NBI -0.0112 -0.0266 0.5024 -0.0174 -0.0416 0.2902 0.0519 0.3317 
  -0.02 -0.06 1.10 -0.05 -0.17 1.12 0.22 1.07 
NBI2 -0.0020 -0.0014 -0.0059 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0041 
  -0.50 -0.36 -1.43 -0.08 -0.29 -0.64 -0.49 -1.55 
FARC 3.0703 3.7429 22.6980 -2.8834 3.7227 3.1396 1.8632 6.8525 
  1.40 1.42 7.09 -1.26 2.38 2.36 1.79 1.77 
ELN -1.7396 1.7141 2.5145 4.3446 -5.1103 8.0493 -2.7003 0.6525 
  -0.63 0.56 0.68 0.92 -0.79 1.99 -0.95 0.28 
PM 0.6129 0.7709 -1.1462 -0.2220 -0.3377 0.2336 1.1177 0.6154 
  1.37 1.32 -2.06 -0.67 -1.19 0.68 2.86 1.16 
GSocRP 0.0078 -0.2331 0.1006 0.0739 0.0102 0.0525 0.0044 -0.1526 
  0.14 -3.12 1.80 1.46 0.68 1.75 0.09 -1.50 
Captures -0.0001 0.0004 0.0015 0.0025 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0011 
  -0.36 0.95 3.88 5.72 -3.17 1.54 -0.44 1.98 
Homicide-1 0.8232 0.7129 0.8165 0.6114 0.6480 0.6513 0.8246 0.6736 
  9.92 10.28 15.05 9.22 19.82 12.52 14.00 5.55 
FARC*ELN 0.1098 4.3677 -0.7665 2.3069 14.9795 -0.3835 2.5334 7.6172 
  0.17 2.62 -0.16 0.26 3.29 -0.34 1.00 2.43 
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 
R2 0.6370 0.5979 0.6852 0.6149 0.6385 0.5325 0.5318 0.5173 
(i) Moran I Statistic  0.0060 0.0166 0.0124 0.0268 0.0117 0.0129 0.0075 0.0063 
P-value 0.0225 2.0000 1.9993 2.0000 1.9990 1.9996 1.9793 1.9581 
(ii) Lagrange Multiplier 1.4443 10.8736 6.0384 28.5245 5.4419 6.5674 2.2479 1.5914 
P-value 0.2294 0.0010 0.0140 0.0000 0.0197 0.0104 0.1338 0.2071 
(iii) Lagrange Multiplier 10.7513 37.5254 11.7326 64.4133 16.5808 19.9415 7.8254 2.2446 
P-value 0.0010 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0052 0.1341 
(iv) Lagrange Multiplier 12.1092 38.3235 11.9364 64.6944 16.5808 20.4624 8.2973 2.3004 
P-value 0.0023 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0158 0.3166 
(v) Lagrange Multiplier 1205.37 1118.49 429.27 1493.76 689.17 272.30 550.62 2888.33 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(vi) Lagrange Multiplier 1206.81 1129.37 435.31 1522.29 694.61 278.86 552.86 2889.92 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(vii) Lagrange Multiplier 1217.48 1156.82 441.21 1558.46 705.75 292.76 558.91 2890.63 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
                                                 
18 Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. White standard errors used to get the statistic. See definitions of variables in 
table 1. (i) Test for Residual Spatial Autocorrelation. (ii) Test for Residual Spatial Autocorrelation. (iii) Test for 
the Omitted Spatial Lag (WY). (iv) Test for Spatial Dependence (rho and lambda). (v) Test for Spatial 
heterogeneity (alpha). (vi) Test for Residual Spatial Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity. (vii) Test for 
Residual Spatial Autocorrelation, Omitted Spatial Lag and Heteroskedasticity. 
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 Table 5. OLS Estimates of the Spatial Model  
1991-1998. 
 
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Constant -20,0130 -54,7216 -37,6293 -52,2805 -12,6616 -39,6327 -33,2313 -22,9850 
-
1,24 
-
2,93 
-
1,88 
-
3,61 
-
1,01 
-
3,35  
-
2,64 
-
1,01 W*Homicide 0,7 90 1,26 4 0,3 41 1,0877 0,6176 0,8586 0,8863 0,5565 
3,74 5,97  2,25 6,13 3,13 4,31 4,66 1,53
GiniUAA 6,5268 -2,2161 3,3178 -2,2257 -6,6615 11,6672 -2,9302 -1,8370 
0,66 -
0,16 
0,21 -
0,20 
-
0,67 
1,04 -
0,18 
-
0,12 GiniRAA -11,1002 1,3653 0,1747 8,5044 2,0089 -0,8244 12,4288 -1,8853 
- 0,13  0,01 0,87 0,20 - 0,91 -
NBI 0,1881 0,1809 0,6794 0,2723 0,0992 0,4358 0,1306 0,4067 
0,41 0,41  1,46 0,78 0,39 1,73 0,56 1,24
NBI2 -0,0032 -0,0021 -0,0065 -0,0022 -0,0014 -0,0031 -0,0024 -0,0044 
- - - - - - - -
FARC 2,8128 3,6104 22,8284 -1,8000 3,5378 3,4289 2,0048 7,0148 
1,36 1,42  6,89 - 2,26 2,66 1,85 1,73
ELN -1,4909 1,0590 2,3347 4,4237 -4,7509 6,8045 -3,0905 0,7482 
- 0,36  0,62 0,99 - 1,67 - 0,32
Captures -0,0006 -0,0009 0,0016 0,0012 -0,0004 0,0000 -0,0008 0,0007 
- - 4,58 2,88 - - - 1,51
Homicide-1 0,7929 0,6521 0,7613 0,5526 0,6094 0,6099 0,7936 0,6475 
9,30 9,23  12,4 8,16 14,6 10,8 12,1 4,68
FARC*ELN 0,0953 4,0047 -0,2072 3,9513 15,1097 0,0347 3,2702 7,6036 
0,14 2,36  - 0,42 3,46 0,03 1,33 2,45
N 678,0000 678,0000 678,0000 678,0000 678,0000 678,0000 678,0000 678,0000 
R2 0,64 0,62 0,68 0,64 0,64 0,54 0,54  0,51 
Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. White standard errors used to get the statistic. See definitions of 
variables in table 1. 
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Table 6. IV Estimates of the Spatial Model. 1991-1998.   
Variable  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Constant -22.8336 -53.1251 -32.2855 -51.8494 -10.2988 -41.3925 -33.1436 -23.9521 
  -1.33 -2.87 -1.53 -3.38 -0.83 -3.48 -2.43 -1.01 
W*Homicide  0.7694 1.2385 0.2933 1.0785 0.5606 0.9033 0.8842 0.5773 
  3.40 5.58 1.49 5.54 2.78 4.21 4.20 1.50 
GiniUAA 6.5983 -2.2691 3.4843 -2.1624 -6.4258 11.5756 -2.9250 -1.8909 
  0.66 -0.17 0.22 -0.20 -0.65 1.03 -0.18 -0.12 
GiniRAA -11.0400 1.3936 0.2164 8.5692 2.3802 -1.1909 12.4420 -1.8738 
  -1.07 0.13 0.02 0.87 0.24 -0.12 0.91 -0.14 
NBI 0.2030 0.1739 0.6603 0.2702 0.0862 0.4407 0.1305 0.4094 
  0.45 0.40 1.41 0.77 0.34 1.75 0.55 1.23 
NBI2 -0.0032 -0.0020 -0.0064 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0045 
  -0.81 -0.51 -1.56 -0.67 -0.58 -1.32 -1.01 -1.64 
FARC 2.7876 3.6231 22.8647 -1.8066 3.5476 3.4211 2.0053 7.0090 
  1.33 1.41 6.92 -0.90 2.26 2.64 1.84 1.71 
ELN -1.5184 1.0719 2.3784 4.4240 -4.7884 6.7701 -3.0898 0.7438 
  -0.48 0.37 0.63 0.99 -0.79 1.66 -1.12 0.32 
Captures -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0017 0.0012 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0008 0.0007 
  -2.39 -2.42 4.59 2.74 -4.08 -0.08 -3.07 1.46 
Homicide-1 0.7904 0.6536 0.7673 0.5531 0.6129 0.6071 0.7937 0.6468 
  9.14 9.08 12.28 7.99 14.71 10.63 11.82 4.66 
FARC*ELN 0.1000 4.0137 -0.2357 3.9501 15.1125 0.0448 3.2695 7.6051 
  0.15 2.44 -0.05 0.43 3.43 0.04 1.34 2.44 
N 678.0000 678.0000 678.0000 678.0000 678.0000 678.0000 678.0000 678.0000 
R2 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.54 0.53 0.51 
Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. White standard errors used to get the statistic. See definitions of variables in 
table 1. 
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Table 7. 3SLS Estimates of the Spatial Model.
1991-1998.
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Constant -19,9747 -54,7651 -37,6612 -52,4521 -12,5970 -39,5958 -33,2445 -34,8210
-0,92 -2,57 -1,82 -3,21 -0,93 -2,70 -1,98 -1,89
W*Homicide 0,7293 1,2652 0,3854 1,0909 0,6175 0,8605 0,8865 0,8097
4,05 7,06 2,13 7,09 3,76 4,30 4,13 3,25
GiniUAA 6,5250 -2,2023 3,3209 -2,2710 -6,6468 11,6279 -2,9277 -2,4273
0,53 -0,15 0,23 -0,17 -0,56 0,88 -0,18 -0,13
GiniRAA -11,1111 1,3689 0,1796 8,5232 2,0022 -0,8083 12,4269 -1,8133
-0,96 0,11 0,02 0,79 0,22 -0,08 0,97 -0,13
NBI 0,1882 0,1813 0,6799 0,2721 0,0994 0,4349 0,1307 0,4390
0,34 0,34 1,31 0,62 0,30 1,28 0,35 1,18
NBI2 -0,0032 -0,0021 -0,0065 -0,0022 -0,0014 -0,0031 -0,0024 -0,0046
-0,66 -0,44 -1,40 -0,55 -0,48 -0,98 -0,70 -1,36
FARC 2,8136 3,6072 22,8286 -1,8093 3,5489 3,4484 2,0028 6,9212
2,35 1,68 16,48 -1,14 5,12 3,28 2,59 6,24
ELN -1,4920 1,0565 2,3333 4,4164 -4,7416 6,7893 -3,0930 0,6578
-0,45 0,39 0,73 1,35 -2,47 3,17 -1,30 0,24
Captures -0,0006 -0,0009 0,0016 0,0012 -0,0004 -0,00001 -0,0008 0,0005
-1,99 -2,41 4,38 3,00 -3,46 -0,03 -2,63 1,12
Homicide-1 0,7929 0,6521 0,7613 0,5528 0,6091 0,6097 0,7935 0,6384
28,48 25,03 27,56 24,68 26,84 20,74 21,89 20,51
FARC*ELN 0,0954 4,0048 -0,2072 3,9558 15,0865 0,0292 3,2716 7,6514
0,15 1,42 -0,04 0,64 5,73 0,05 3,93 2,73
Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. See definitions of variables in table 1.  
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Table 8. OLS Estimates of the Spatial Model with PM and GSocRP.
1991-1998.
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Constant -22,5987 -50,3209 -24,1102 -43,1549 -3,7530 -41,9916 -37,7469 -21,5218
-1,39 -2,58 -1,09 -2,65 -0,27 -3,38 -2,71 -0,94
W*Homicide 0,6785 1,2305 0,6835 1,1996 0,7161 0,9632 0,7288 0,4814
3,46 6,15 3,54 6,77 3,56 4,59 3,87 1,50
GiniUAA 5,3416 0,6099 4,2160 -2,9696 -6,5490 8,8730 -2,8886 1,2472
0,54 0,04 0,28 -0,27 -0,66 0,80 -0,18 0,08
GiniRAA -10,3583 0,6335 -9,1223 3,0894 -1,4427 -3,5054 10,4046 -0,5224
-1,01 0,06 -0,71 0,29 -0,14 -0,35 0,80 -0,04
NBI 0,1876 0,2592 0,6360 0,2892 0,1246 0,3970 0,1082 0,3928
0,42 0,59 1,40 0,85 0,50 1,54 0,47 1,22
NBI2 -0,0030 -0,0029 -0,0066 -0,0027 -0,0021 -0,0026 -0,0017 -0,0045
-0,75 -0,73 -1,64 -0,83 -0,89 -1,09 -0,77 -1,69
FARC 2,7440 3,6233 22,4892 -1,8848 3,6711 3,1425 1,8235 6,8835
1,31 1,41 6,88 -0,98 2,38 2,36 1,80 1,75
ELN -1,9221 1,3310 2,2203 4,2474 -4,5876 7,5777 -2,9551 0,6282
-0,67 0,44 0,58 0,92 -0,75 1,89 -1,07 0,27
PM 0,2233 -0,0288 -1,5452 -0,7650 -0,6480 -0,1359 0,6790 0,3569
0,50 -0,07 -2,26 -2,19 -1,97 -0,42 1,83 0,76
GSocRP 0,0328 -0,1609 0,1061 0,0897 0,0160 0,0641 0,0111 -0,1492
0,55 -2,34 1,92 1,87 0,98 2,38 0,22 -1,49
Captures -0,0005 -0,0008 0,0007 0,0008 -0,0006 0,00002 -0,0005 0,0007
-1,65 -1,83 1,70 2,16 -4,45 0,10 -1,98 1,46
Homicide-1 0,7911 0,6517 0,7811 0,5521 0,6038 0,5910 0,7885 0,6602
9,13 9,11 13,30 8,20 14,56 10,45 11,95 5,19
FARC*ELN 0,1528 3,8957 -0,6305 2,0225 14,8371 -0,2094 2,8613 7,6543
0,23 2,34 -0,13 0,23 3,42 -0,18 1,15 2,40
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678
R2 0,6433 0,6214 0,6913 0,6453 0,6477 0,5472 0,5385 0,5197
Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. White standard errors used to get the statistic. See definitions of variables in
table 1.  
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Table 9. IV Estimates of the Spatial Model with PM and GSocRP.
1991-1998.
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Constant -25,6205 -48,4786 -22,7105 -43,9815 -1,9911 -44,2505 -40,1742 -20,6028
-1,48 -2,49 -1,01 -2,61 -0,15 -3,47 -2,73 -0,88
W*Homicide 0,7321 1,1936 0,6532 1,2216 0,6623 1,0327 0,8023 0,4575
3,35 5,82 2,87 6,39 3,26 4,67 3,68 1,34
GiniUAA 5,4374 0,5369 4,2436 -3,0985 -6,3524 8,7064 -3,0654 1,2837
0,55 0,04 0,28 -0,28 -0,64 0,78 -0,19 0,08
GiniRAA -10,3470 0,7727 -9,0048 2,8824 -0,9930 -4,1217 10,1107 -0,5746
-1,01 0,07 -0,70 0,27 -0,10 -0,42 0,78 -0,04
NBI 0,2033 0,2506 0,6301 0,2949 0,1121 0,4047 0,1138 0,3898
0,45 0,57 1,39 0,86 0,45 1,57 0,48 1,19
NBI2 -0,0030 -0,0029 -0,0066 -0,0027 -0,0020 -0,0027 -0,0018 -0,0045
-0,77 -0,72 -1,63 -0,85 -0,85 -1,11 -0,78 -1,66
FARC 2,7183 3,6269 22,4984 -1,8665 3,6749 3,1427 1,8195 6,8820
1,29 1,39 6,87 -0,97 2,38 2,35 1,79 1,75
ELN -1,9365 1,3425 2,2333 4,2457 -4,6268 7,5436 -2,9808 0,6295
-0,68 0,45 0,59 0,93 -0,76 1,88 -1,08 0,28
PM 0,1926 -0,0048 -1,5275 -0,7750 -0,6247 -0,1626 0,6348 0,3697
0,44 -0,01 -2,16 -2,27 -1,90 -0,51 1,67 0,77
GSocRP 0,0348 -0,1630 0,1059 0,0900 0,0155 0,0649 0,0118 -0,1494
0,59 -2,35 1,90 1,87 0,98 2,39 0,24 -1,49
Captures -0,0006 -0,0007 0,0008 0,0008 -0,0005 0,0000 -0,0005 0,0007
-1,80 -1,79 1,66 1,92 -4,38 -0,02 -2,06 1,45
Homicide-1 0,7886 0,6535 0,7827 0,5510 0,6071 0,5866 0,7848 0,6609
9,01 8,96 13,07 8,01 14,62 10,19 11,63 5,19
FARC*ELN 0,1562 3,9098 -0,6365 2,0172 14,8478 -0,1969 2,8943 7,6524
0,24 2,42 -0,13 0,23 3,39 -0,17 1,18 2,40
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678
R2 0,6439 0,6180 0,6903 0,6435 0,6458 0,5470 0,5392 0,5192
Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. White standard errors used to get the statistic. See definitions of variables in
table 1.  
 
  
23
Table 10. IV Estimates of the Spatial Model 
Treating Captures an PM as Endogenous. 1991-1998.
Variable 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Constant -24,9128 -49,9294 -20,9433 -43,1549 -1,8946 -44,0926 -39,9181 -20,8963
-1,48 -2,55 -0,93 -2,65 -0,14 -3,42 -2,68 -0,89
W*Homicide 0,7391 1,1999 0,6257 1,1996 0,6676 1,0087 0,7651 0,4642
3,32 5,77 2,76 6,77 3,23 4,52 3,53 1,35
GiniUAA 5,5527 0,4730 4,0907 -2,9696 -6,2013 8,8473 -2,7986 1,2663
0,56 0,03 0,27 -0,27 -0,63 0,80 -0,17 0,08
GiniRAA -10,0296 0,8715 -9,5381 3,0894 -0,8728 -3,6027 10,4709 -0,5739
-0,98 0,08 -0,75 0,29 -0,09 -0,37 0,81 -0,04
NBI 0,1868 0,2579 0,6452 0,2892 0,1046 0,3917 0,0970 0,3908
0,42 0,59 1,41 0,85 0,42 1,52 0,42 1,19
NBI2 -0,0030 -0,0029 -0,0067 -0,0027 -0,0019 -0,0026 -0,0016 -0,0045
-0,75 -0,72 -1,65 -0,83 -0,83 -1,06 -0,71 -1,66
FARC 2,7369 3,5936 22,5349 -1,8848 3,6845 3,1240 1,8051 6,8813
1,30 1,38 6,89 -0,98 2,39 2,32 1,77 1,75
ELN -1,9777 1,3342 2,2965 4,2474 -4,6466 7,5060 -2,9948 0,6288
-0,69 0,45 0,60 0,92 -0,76 1,88 -1,08 0,27
PM 0,1713 0,0348 -1,5672 -0,7650 -0,6290 -0,1011 0,7389 0,3681
0,39 0,08 -2,20 -2,19 -1,95 -0,32 1,95 0,77
GSocRP 0,0367 -0,1640 0,1059 0,0897 0,0153 0,0639 0,0101 -0,1494
0,62 -2,36 1,90 1,87 0,97 2,36 0,20 -1,49
Captures -0,0007 -0,0007 0,0009 0,0008 -0,0006 0,0000 -0,0005 0,0007
-1,98 -1,70 1,89 2,16 -4,51 -0,09 -2,05 1,45
Homicide-1 0,7885 0,6525 0,7850 0,5521 0,6076 0,5885 0,7865 0,6606
9,00 8,96 13,11 8,20 14,63 10,20 11,64 5,19
FARC*ELN 0,1545 3,9132 -0,6477 2,0225 14,8416 -0,2002 2,8556 7,6528
0,24 2,42 -0,13 0,23 3,39 -0,18 1,16 2,40
N 678 678 678 678 678 678 678 678
R2 0,6436 0,6185 0,6899 0,6453 0,6457 0,5462 0,5385 0,5192
Asymptotic t-statistics in italics. White standard errors used to get the statistic. See definitions of variables in
table 1.  
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